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CHEVRON OIL COMP ANY, doing business 
as STANDARD OIL COMP ANY OF 
CALIFORNIA, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
BEAVER COUNTY, a legislative corporation 
of the State of Utah, et al., 
Def end.ants and Respondents. 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMP ANY, a 
Delaware corporation, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
BEAVER COUNTY, a legislative corporation 
of the State of Utah, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
11,317 
Case No. 
11,318 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants adopt the plaintiffs' statement of facts 
with minor exceptions which are neither substantial nor 
material to a proper understanding of the points of law 
involved. They proceed to add additional facts, some 
of which are without any support whatever in the record. 
This extraneous matter consists of statements that the 
(•ommercial zone in the county has been extended several 
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hundred feet further to the north since the zomng map 
was adopted and that at the time of the trial there 
existed in this commercial zone five service stations, two 
restaurants and two petroleum storage plants, including 
one of Phillips Petroleum Company, and that a portion 
of a motel has, since the trial, been constructed in the 
conunercial zone. Respondents cite no evidence or other 
part of the record to support the alleged statements, and 
appellants deny the correctness of them. 
Another entirely unsupported statement is that since 
the trial, the State Highway Department and the Bureau 
of Public Roads have changed their policy and re-de-
signed the interchanges at both ends of Beaver City so 
to enable traffic in either direction to both leave and 
return to the freeway and proceed in either direction 
when returning to the freeway; that this highway re-
arrangement will permit easy access to and from the 
freeway at each end of Beaver City at least equal to 
the access at Pine Creek Hill; that Beaver City is now 
in the process of annexing to its corporate area the 
property contained in the present commercial zone north 
of Beaver City as well as additional properties to the 
interchange, and that it is virtually certain that such 
annexation will be completed in the near future. Just 
what bearing these unsupported assertions have upon 
the question whether the zoning ordinance confiscates 
the plaintiffs' property or is arbitrary, capricious and 
unreasonable is not pointed out. We will C'ornrnent on 
this later. 
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Our statement that no other property in the country 
has such access to the interstate freeway as the plain-
tiffs' property is justified by the evidence (R. 166-7), 
and Exhibits 14 and 15 do not indicate the contrary. 
Whether the stated fact is correct is not of controlling 
importance. 
THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
ZONING RESOLUTION 
Respondents nowhere deny that the zoning resolu-
tion confiscates the plaintiffs' property. They rely on 
the proposition that the zoning power vested in them is 
plenary and that the ordinance must he sustained if there 
is a debatable question whether it has any tendency at 
all to promote the public welfare. 
The contention is in the very teeth of the decisions 
of both this Court and the Supreme Court of the United 
Ntates which have repeatedly held that the zoning power 
cannot he exerted to deprive a property owner of sub-
stantially all of the economic or profitable use of his 
i1roperty even if the public welfare demands the restric-
tion. 
Respondents are unable to differentiate the present 
case from the cases cited in our opening brief. The con-
trolling circumstances in the cited cases are exactly par-
allel to those in the present case. The deciding factor 
in all of them is that highway construction or commercial 
or industrial development in the neighborhood has given 
1o the property a new and greater utility, which the 
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zoning n'striction has prevented the property owner from 
realizing. In all of the cited cases, the new utility arose 
after the enactment of the ordinance. The case at bar 
is a clearer case of confiscation than the cited cases ht'· 
cause the new utility was in existence or certain to come 
into existl'nce in a hrief period when the ordinanct> was 
enacted. In addition, the present ordinance was l'nacted 
for the express purpose of enabling the town of Beaver 
to monopolize freeway-created bm;iness. 
It is irrelevant that the ordinance does not prevent 
the use to which the property was previously adapted. 
'I1he important consideration is that the prior adaptabilit)· 
has been superseded by a higher economic and profitahle 
use. 
Ko legal significance can be attached to the sever-
ance of plaintiffs' property from larger tracts. It is also 
irrelevant when the property was acquired. Zoning is 
not concerned with either title or ownership, past or 
present, as this Court has so clearly pointed out in 
Gibbons and Recd Company vs. North Salt Lake City, 
cited in our opening briPf. The case of Clmsud i-s. [(ens-
ington, 255 N.Y.2d 411 is also a well reasoned decision 
in point. The ordinance would confiscate the property 
even if the plaintiffs had acquired the entire tracts and 
regardless of the date of the conveyance. 
The respondents n~ly on Dowse vs. Salt Lake City as 
a controlling authority on the constitutional question. 
Because of the totally different circmnstances, the two 
cases are not in the same ballpark. The DowsP property 
consisted of a small corner lot in Nalt Lah City ancl 
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was z;oned residential in accordance with a carefully de-
;;;igw•d master plan. The mtire block in which it was 
l<watPd was zoned residential, as well as the block to the 
~outh and the one to the southeast. The complaint alleged 
that the Dowse property was unsuitable for residential 
property, but the undisputed physical facts revealed the 
contrary. Since the ordinance did not prevent substan-
tially all profitable and economic use, it did not violate 
constitutional guaranties. Plaintiffs' property is located 
iu the middlP of the desert, twenty-one miles from any 
habitation or other structure within Beaver County. An 
iutPrstate freeway has converted it from a goat pasture 
into a very valuable commercial site. If the plan adopted 
hy the planning commission and by the zoning commis-
;;ion had heen carried out, it would have been classified 
as Highway St>r'Vice Zone property. The Dowse property 
was classifif'd in compliance with a master plan for the 
zoning of Salt Lake City. 
'l'lw d0cision in the Dowse case rests squarely on 
the proposition that zoning authorities are vested with 
!Pgislative power to fix the boundaries of the different 
zones. Courts will not judicially alter or extend these 
boundaries unless the zoning board has acted arbitrarily 
or um·pasonabl~'· In the circumstances surrounding the 
Dowl'e property, there was no basis for a finding that 
tliP hoard acted arbitrarily or discriminatively. Whether 
the ordinancP df'prived Dowse of all or substantially all 
(·f·onomic or profitable use "·as not considered or passed 
upon. lt was manifrst that thP ordinance had no such 
l'l'l'uet. 
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Neither docs Gayland 1·s. Salt Lake Co111ity afford 
the respondents any support. Hf>rc the property owner 
attacked the ordinance upon the ground that no mastrr 
plan was adopted and that the commission based its 
refusal to rezone tlw property upon protests and objec-
tions by neighboring property owuers. No evidence was 
offered or received in the trial court on the question 
whether the ordinance confiscated the plaintiff's property 
or whether it was arbitrary, capricious or discriminator)·. 
In this posture of the case, the only questions presented 
in the Supreme Court were whether the adoption of a 
master plan was a condition precedent to the validity of 
the ordinance, and whether the commission could prop-
erly base its refusal to amend the ordinance upon 
its own knowledge, information, investigation and 
study. l\ o such problems are presented in the case 
at bar. Plaintiffs have never contended that the 
present ordinance is i1ffalid because 110 master plau 
"..-as adopted. Likewise, plaintiffs do not contend that 
the zoning authorities may not properly consider an» 
information pertinent to the inquiry regardless of how 
they acquire it. 'Vhat the plaintiffs do contend is that 
the evidence which they introducPd in the trial court 
establshes as a matter of law that the ordinance is uncon-
stitutional because it deprives them of substantially all 
economic or profitable use of their property and is arbi-
trary, capricious and discriminatory. 
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It is true, as respondents contend, that the freeway 
doH not deprive the plaintiffs' property of its suitability 
for grazing purposes any more than Highway U.S. 91 
did. ·what the freeway did was to add an important 
appendage to plaintiffs' property. U.S. 91 did nothing 
for plaintiffs' property. It is accessible at any point and 
passes through cities and towns. The freeway extends 
from coast to coast, is non-accessible except at intervals 
and by-passes all cities and towns. 
THE ZONING RESOLUTION IS CAPRICIOUS, 
DI8CRIMINATORY AND VOID, AND THE 
BOARD ACTED ARBITRARILY IN 
REFUSING TO AMEND IT 
Respondents cite several cases in support of the 
proposition that this Court will not substitute its judg-
ment for that of zoning authorities on the question 
whether the restriction is required to promote the public 
welfare in situations where the issue is debatable. The 
proposition is well settled and we do not controvert it. 
1'1w problem lies in applying it to the facts and circum-
stances involved in the particular case. 
All parties are now agreed that the restriction on 
th<> usP of plaintiffs' property cannot be sustained unless 
it promotes the public welfare in a substantial and real-
i~tic manner. \Ve have demonstrated in our opening 
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brief, and it is not controverted hy respondents, that if 
the restriction confiscat<>s th<' plaintiffs' property, it is 
void, even though the public welfare requires it. 
Rt>spondents argtw that unless the restriction is sus-
tained, economic conditions in the town of BPaver will 
deteriorate and that any substantial reduction in busi-
ness activity in or near the town will cause a loss of 
service and facilities requirt>d to sustain community life. 
·we are told that what is in the best intt>rests of the 
inhabitants of the incorporated areas is also in the best 
interests of the inhabitants of the unincorporated area, 
as each is dependent upon the other. This we submit 
is a confession that blockading business activity at Pine 
Creek Hill is detrimental not only to the best interests 
of the nnincorporated ar<>as, bnt also the incorporated 
areas. It demonstrates that the ordinance is discrimina-
tory as a matter of law. 
It is impossible to reconcile defendants' denial that 
the ordinance was designed to eliminate competition and 
its contention that plaintiffs' activities at Pine Creek 
Hill will dangeronsly diminish husiness activity in the 
town of Beaver. TherP is no escape from the conclusion 
that tlw design and pnrpose of this ordinance was to 
funnel the freeway-generated husiness into the town. 
Ther<:> is no other objectiw which it could accomplish. 
The unincorporated area of Beaver County is a desert. 
There is nothing npon which the legitimate functions of 
zoning can operate. Restricting the use of propert:v in 
this barren territory is a uwre pretext for protecting 
local business interests. Such legislation finds no sup-
port in the statute, and is unla"·fnl. 
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N eitlwr the Gayland cas<• nor the Dowse case can 
L<' tort nred into ]ff Peeden ts for the proposition that elim-
ination of competition is a legitimate function of zoning. 
The argument that plaintiffs have been invited to 
establsh new facilities in the commercial area near the 
town shows that the ordinance was not intended to elim-
inate competition is unfounded. Additional facilities in 
this small commercial zone would not serve the freeway 
motorist any better than the present established facilities 
in the town. The freeway by-passes this small commer-
cial area just as it by-passes the town of Beaver. 
It is the greatly increased traffic which will com<' 
into Beavt>r County over the intt>rstate freeway, par-
ticnlarl>· after I-70 is completed, that creates the business 
which plaintiffs hope to capture at Pine Creek Hill and 
which the ordinance seeks to funnel into the town. It 
is a clear case of eliminating business competition by thr 
vehicle of zoning. 
The evidence in this case is convincing that the town 
of Bt>avPr cannot captnre the freeway-oriented business 
hy preventing plaintiffs' activities at Pine Creek Hill. 
Because the freeway by-passes the town of Beaver, the 
business appurtenant to the frpeway will also by-pass the 
town. 
Defendants have apparently become aware of this 
situation since the trial of the case. They inform lls 
that they have persuaded the highway authorities to con-
~truct an interchange opposite the town of Beaver so as 
to intercept the business which is on its wa>' to Cedar 
City and points beyond. 
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The position of the town of Beaver is more unenvi-
able than that of the dog in the manger. It is not only 
unable to capture the freeway business by blockading it 
at Pine Creek Hill, but actually diverts it to points 
beyond the county, to the economic detriment of the 
entire area. Every tourist dollar captured at Pine Creek 
Hill is hay in the barn, not only for the town of Beaver, 
but the entire county. 
Respondents' argument with respect to possible re-
duction in tax base and increased government costs which 
would result from plaintiffs' proposed development rests 
on an exceedingly slender thread. It is without factual 
foundation and is in conflict with the undisputed evi-
dence. It is entirely speculative and fanciful. 
Respondents admit that the proposed project at Pine 
Creek Hill will increase the tax base of the county. The 
attempt to convince the court that this increase will be 
offset fails because the evidence does not support it. 
Respondents' theory that the releasing of plaintiffs' 
property from the restriction will undermine stability 
and set an evil precedent of zoning is unique. In prac-
tice, defendants' theory means that property uses should 
be frozen and that future economic progress should be 
halted. This is not the theory of lawful zoning which 
considers every piece of property in connection with 
its own surrounding circumstances and that changes in 
these circumstances require changes in the restrictions 
upon its use. Neither zoning nor rezoning has any legiti-
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mate concern with precedent or what the past history of 
the property has been. It looks only at the present and 
to the future. 
Respondents' assertion that there is no public need 
for commercial facilities at Pine Creek Hill finds no 
support in any of the evidence. The uncontradicted evi-
dence establishes the contrary. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that I-15 is a 
non-access freeway. Motorists demand freeway-oriented 
service. The zoning experts who testified in tlus case 
agree that it is essential to the health, safety and con-
venience of motorists that roadside supplies and services 
he available at intervals along the freeway. Plaintiffs, 
who are engaged in the business of serving the motoring 
public, have decided that Pine Creek Hill is an excellent 
site. They are so convinced of it that they are willing 
to invest large sums of money in the venture. What 
better evidence is available on this point than that of 
persons having vast experience in furnishing these serv-
ices in all western states? Furthermore, qualified ex-
perts, who have made careful surveys of business condi-
tions in the area, are in accord that Pine Creek Hill 
is ideally located to serve the needs of the motoring 
public. 
A feeble attempt is made to cope with plaintiffs' 
proposition that in adopting the ordinance a legislative 
determination was made that the public \Yelfare de-
manded that plaintiffs' property be classified as High-
way Service Zone property. They know or should know 
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that rezoning property can hP aeeomplished only by 
amending the ordinance and that tlw ordinance cannot 
be amended Pxcept by notieP and }waring. Tt is an insult 
to ordinary intelligence to say, as the author of the 
ordinance does, that the provision was made for the 
Highway ServicP Zone in the original ordinance because 
it would facilitate future classification of property in 
that zone. The present brief of rPspondents has aban-
doned this explanation. Dcfendants now say that the 
only legislative determination made when the ordinance 
was adopted was that thPre might be a need at some 
future time for a highway service facility along a frre-
way sevPra1 miles from an existing community; that the 
decision of whether or not to creak a highway service 
zone and how many was lPft for future determination. 
rl_1he short answer to this flimsy Pxplanation is that the 
ordinance contains no sud1 provisions. It creates a high-
way serYice zone then and there, and nothing is deferred 
for any future detPrrnination or considPration. Respond-
ents are attf~mpting to amend the zoning plan and other 
provisions of the ordinance by parol. 
The faintPst item of support for the zoning. restric-
tion is that plaintiffs do not need any ontlPts at Pine 
Creek Hill and that thPy ean supply the nePds of the 
public from the outlets which they already haw. De-
fendants seem to have the imvression that they arc' em-
lJOwered to exPrcis<• the functions of appellants' hoards 
of directors. \V c an' also told that the proposPd opera-
tions will result in financial loss. '!'his is a rather strik-
ing examph• of tlw dPfrndants' total disn•gard for the 
lin-1itations plaeed h~- tlH' l<•gislature on tlH• po,n•rs of 
.I 
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r.onmg authorities. It is not at all surprising that de-
frndants had no hesitancy in confiscating the plaintiffs' 
property. They assume their zoning powers are com-
pletely unrestricted. Neither the Constitution of the 
rnited States nor the Constitution of the state were 
gin•n the slightest consideration in framing the zoning 
n·solntion now under attack. 
CONCLUSION 
The zoning resolution imposes a restriction on the 
plaintiffs' property which deprives them of all economic 
or profitahle use thereof. No corresponding public bene-
fit is derived from the restriction. On the contrary, the 
n•striction is positively detrimental to the public good 
lwcause it prevents the establishment of a substantial 
commercial development which would produce much 
neeth'd employment and revenue practically free of 
diarge of government expense. The ordinance is unlaw-
fully designed and enacted to capture and control the 
iww hnsiness which will flow from the traffic upon the 
intt>rstate freeway and divert it into a single, small com-
munity which is not ewn within the area subject to the 
zoning law. It is discriminatory on its face. It is arbi-
trar~' and unreasonable because it does not accomplish 
any public benefit. It deprives the motoring public of a 
~e1Tice which is essential to health, safety and conven-
IPllCC, 
The pre-trial order framed no issues of fact, and 
tl1np tll'P no conflicts in the evidence upon any controlling 
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matter. The trial court made no findings of fact and 
its judgment should be vacated with directions to enter 
judgment as prayed for in the complaints. 
Respectfully suhmitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
GRANT H. BAGLEY and 
LEONARD J. LEWIS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Chevron Oil Company 
VERDEN E. BETTILYON of 
BETTIL YON & HOW ARD 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
MA COY A. McMURRA Y of 
McKAY AND BURTON 
500 Kennecott Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants Phillips 
Petroleum Company and Deseret 
Investors Group, Inc. 
